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This essay examines recent South Korean cultural transformations to contest 
the theoretical viability of recent accounts of globalization and political 
economy. Applying Appadurai's "mediascape" to the Korean context, I argue 
that while the demise of the state as touted by many popular and economic 
liberal scholars since the early 1990's remains a possibility, it is not likely in 
South Korea given its distinctive economic and cultural developmental path. In 
the Korean context, the structural logic of globalization and the recent history 
of the global economy can ironically be read as rationalizing the strong state. 
The absence of a universalizable logic connecting economic globalization to the 
diminution of state power accentuates the importance of attention to the 
normative or ideological dimensions of global order. The essay thus explores 
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different kinds of stateness and their consequences, with more explicit 
attention to how the modern state, by intervening in the national media 
industry, can shape and deflect its own participation in global regimes to a 
larger extent than typically conceded by globalization scholars. 
The Role of the State in the National Mediascape: The Case of South Korea 
Globalization, now a ubiquitous concept in the popular mind, encompasses 
multiple and even drastic changes in all areas of social life, especially 
economics and culture. Not surprisingly, its meaning varies considerably 
depending on whose perspective does the emphasizing, and thus globalization 
can be discussed in economic, political, and cultural terms. Whether expressed 
through the vernaculars of neo-liberal economics, critical theory, or 
postmodernity, globalization is by now widely applicable to a range of debates 
pertaining to homogenization/heterogenization and local/global issues.  
Globalization has many faces. In the area of economics, practices favoring free 
trade, private enterprise, foreign investment, and liberalized trade prevail. With 
respect to social and cultural forces, new consumption patterns and lifestyles 
with consequences for migration and social organization have arisen. In turn, 
the flows of people, goods, information, and images reflect the influence of 
communication processes (Featherstone, 1990; Appadurai, 1996). New 
identities and imaginaries are thus constituted.  
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While it is hard to deny the recent expansion of global interconnectivity, the 
specific ways in which globalization is stipulated as an objective reality are not 
always tenable, since globalization remains an ongoing project whose final 
realization might yet be interrupted. Forgetting and sometimes intentionally 
neglecting the nature of globalization as an ongoing project, globalization 
advocates from both the right (e.g., adherents of the “end of history/end of 
ideology” argument) and the left (e.g., those who still defend the cultural 
imperialism thesis) often ask misleading questions about the nature of 
globalization, when globalization began and the extent to which the world is 
globalized.  
Globalization accounts emphasizing technological change have led some leftist 
critics to read it as an effect of inhuman causes, the predictable outcome of 
overdetermination, and a necessary outcome of the formidable economic and 
cultural imperialism by which transnational capitals threaten national 
sovereignty and aboriginal culture (Schiller, 1991). Hardt and Negri’s widely 
read account (2000) sees globalization as simply the newest title for the 
reemergence of Empire, which although dominated for now by America and 
historically anticipated by Rome, foreshadows an emerging complex of 
transnational capital flows. Others, focusing on the intensification of global 
connectivity seen in the late 20th century, concentrate instead on the 
acceleration of economic interactions after nation-states emerged triumphant 
from the wars declared by imperialism (Held et al. 1999).  
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Most discussion of the role of the traditional nation-state given globalization 
highlight relationships between state and market and yield two common but 
contrary positions. Neoliberalists tend to offer a negative view of the state in 
developing countries, characterizing it as corrupt, self-interested, and 
incompetent (Mosley et al., 1991). The imposition of privatization, deregulation, 
decentralization, and further integration into the global economy have, not 
surprisingly, coincided with a decrease in public expenditures in such countries 
(Gonzalez, 1996). Under the force of such trends, some see the state as 
increasingly powerless, even rendered obsolete by globalization while liberated 
market economies progressively fulfill the traditional functions of state power. 
But a larger number of observers take the view that although globalization is 
changing the role of the state, it will remain an important actor (Featherstone, 
1990; Giddens, 2004).  
These diverging accounts can be illustrated with reference to Korea's 
experience with globalization, a point elaborated in the rest of this essay. In 
Korea, a discourse of globalization began to permeate national life starting in 
the early 1990's, when the Kim Young-Sam government (1992-1997) made 
globalization a national priority. As we shall see, betraying a theoretical 
tendency (Hardt & Negri 2000, Castells 2000, Mosley et al. 1991) to see nation 
states as a hopeless victim of transnational capitalism, or to consider 
globalization as a unilateral process dictated by imperialist states, the South 
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Korean state aggressively seized the initiative to create and strongly encourage 
globalization.  
New Perspectives on the State 
In what follows, I argue that while the demise of state in this era of 
globalization remains a possibility, it is not a universal likelihood, especially in 
countries like South Korea (hereafter Korea) whose distinctive historical path of 
economic and cultural changes have brought state power and global capital into 
a close alliance. In the context of regionally variable circumstances, the 
discourse of inevitable nation-state demise (to put it plainly) simply distorts 
interpretations of state capacity. The dangers implicit in such a misreading are 
considerable; in fact, the real danger may be not that states will end up as 
thoroughly marginal but the contrary, that meaner and more repressive 
mechanisms of state coercion will be reluctantly accepted by sullen populations 
as the only sure way to avoid total institutional collapse.  
Preoccupation with the demise of the state diverts decision makers from fuller 
consideration of the positive possibilities for increasing state capacity so they 
might more effectively meet the new demands they face. My aim is thus to 
explore different modes of stateness and their consequences, with explicit 
attention to the empirical effects of globalization in the Korean context. There, 
the structural logic of globalization and the recent history of the global 
economy can be ironically read as rationalizing an important role for the state. 
And the absence of a clear logic connecting economic globalization to the 
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diminishing state role sheds light on the ideological dimensions of the 
emerging global order.  
To gain purchase on the complex interactions where articulations of state 
power validate globalization, this essay explores the role of the Korean state in 
sustaining national culture industries. Explicit state support for national culture 
can be understood as exemplifying the state's last gasp, but I shall argue the 
opposite, that state management of national cultural institutions actually 
enhances its capacity for controlling the discourse of globalization and its 
enactment in what Appadurai has called national mediascapes. What emerges is 
an account of globalization more fully attuned to the possibility of complex and 
multidimensional processes reflecting national contexts rather than obliterating 
them.  
Of course Korea has not been totally immune to globalization. But the broader 
point of this essay is that local/national factors are the controlling factors in 
conceptualizing the pace and specificity of globalization. Recent changes in the 
Korean media industry document this view, since the media played a major role 
in Korea’s corporatist political economic development despite noticeable 
changes in the 1990's prompted by the eagerness of large Korean corporations 
(or chaebol) to acquire media properties. 
Chaebols are corporate conglomerates structured around a single and 
sometimes vast holding company. The parent company is typically controlled 
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by one family and subsidiaries often hold shares in each other. Considering the 
historical significance of the traditional relationship between state and 
corporation in Korea's economic development, one can reasonably assume that 
the corporations’ new business strategy bears some relationship to state policy. 
Thus, taking a political economic perspective, this paper deals with the 
relationship between the state, the private sector, the media and national 
development. 
Since achieving economic growth based on export-oriented industrialization 
was a major national goal, the Korean media industry was also confined by this 
paradigm. The major role of the media was to promote national interests and 
contribute to economic modernization. Given this purpose, limiting the 
freedom of the press was taken for granted. Since the media were seen as a tool 
for social integration and control, the state actively relied on it to solve political 
problems, justify its own legitimacy and achieve rapid modernization and 
economic growth (Park, 2000). Meanwhile, as the nation devoted itself to 
export-oriented industrialization by focusing on manufacturing, the culture 
industry was ignored apart from its functional contribution to economic 
strategy.  
Here the application of Arjun Appadurai's vision of globalization as partly 
reliant on mediascapes is a helpful theoretical supplement, and this is even 
more true when connected to his analysis of ideoscapes the complexities of 
political economy. The central questions that my paper raises are twofold. What 
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are the economic and cultural consequences of the practice and appropriation 
of globalization with regard to national media industries? And, what kind of 
role does the nation-state play in this process? Resisting the temptation to 
make sweeping generalizations about the process of economic and cultural 
globalization (such as those made by observers who insist on treating it as an 
objective reality), a careful analysis requires one to investigate how national 
mediascapes are transformed through discursive practices and the ideological 
appropriations accomplished in the name of globalization, all in a nuanced and 
context-specific way.  
On the one hand, this paper suggests that globalization be seen as a discursive 
invention that has been strategically deployed since the early 1990’s in Korea. A 
review of these trends suggests that the process of economic transformation 
has produced steady deregulation of, and increasing state intervention into, 
media industries. This is a trajectory not anticipated by the most popular 
accounts of globalization. On the other hand, the paper highlights the active 
role of the state in producing and disseminating globalization discourse and in 
shaping the structure of the media industry in response to the globalization 
realities. 
Mainly newspaper articles dealing with marked changes in the Korean media 
industry in the 1990's are analyzed to account for this counterintuitive 
outcome. Such evidence sheds light on the government enactment of new 
policies, the broader trends of corporate investment, and the active role of the 
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state in supervising a conducive relationship while transforming the media and 
culture industries.  
The Role of the State: A Historical Overview 
A study of globalization should begin by briefly noting the local and historical 
as well as global context. Korea has always been aware of its vulnerability to its 
two giant neighbors (China and Japan), and it has both benefited and suffered 
from being sandwiched between them. Modern Korean nationalism, which 
initially emerged as an ideological response to 19th century Western 
encroachments and 20th century Japanese colonialism, came to be utilized by 
both North and South Korea as a means to rationalize their respective desires 
for unification. Some scholars argue that traditional Korean isolationism (some 
might even name this sentiment xenophobia), is deeply embedded in the 
Korean psyche, so that through the post-Korean War period and even until the 
late 1980's, South Korea remained only a partially opened country in much of 
its mentality and economic practices (Bridges, 2001).  
Korea’s social formation in the twentieth century was greatly affected by its 
relationship with its strong neighbors: Japan, China, Russia, and from a longer 
distance, the United States. Because of its failure to accommodate internal 
demands for a modern revolution when the country faced imperialistic powers 
in the nineteenth century, Korea was subjugated as a Japanese colony for 
almost thirty-six full years (1910-1945). Following World War II and the 
resulting liberation from Japanese colonial rule, Korea once again failed to 
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reconcile foreign pressures with internal divisions, and as a result, Korea 
experienced civil war and the division of its peninsula (Ryoo, 2004).  
Until recently, Korea was considered one of the poorest countries in the world. 
Japanese colonial domination and devastation, followed by the Korean War 
(1950-1953), trapped Korea in vicious cycles of poverty and underdevelopment. 
National division, protracted military confrontation with North Korea, and 
pervasive social and political instabilities further constrained the potential for 
economic development in South Korea. Despite these obstacles, however, since 
the early 1960’s Korea has achieved remarkable economic success, 
transforming itself from an isolated agricultural society into a major industrial 
power within a single generation. A nation defined by its muddy subsistence 
farming economy was dramatically changed into one of the world’s largest 
producers of ships, electrical appliances, automobiles and microchips. Korea is 
now the world’s eleventh largest country in economic size and the seventh 
largest in trade volume. Its unprecedented success has often been touted as a 
model for third world countries seeking a more successful development 
strategy (Kil & Moon, 2001). 
Although geography has not provided Koreans with security, ethnicity has. As a 
culturally homogenous people in a well defined peninsular area, surrounded by 
states and societies that are plainly more powerful, Koreans have managed to 
preserve their cultural traditions under what must be described as 
overwhelming odds. First in the face of the monolith China, then in spite of a 
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brutal Japanese colonial period, and then under the powerful influences of 
Americanization, Koreans have remained whole, distinctively as Koreans. No 
matter how much factional politics weakened the Chosun Dynasty (1392-1909), 
and no matter how acerbic and often unproductive contemporary Korean 
politics are, Korea has survived as both a culture and a people (Steinberg, 
2002).  
The uri-ism (the we-ness or one-ness) of Koreans has been reinforced by the 
threats to its existence. In this sense, nationalism has been configured more as 
a utopia in Korea than as a merely oppressive ideology, even though the latter 
is a normal trajectory for many western nation-states. The relatively tight web 
of Korean consciousness or “Koreanness” was thus formed under specific 
historical and geographical conditions, and it also appeared before specific 
national communities were imaginable or modern versions of the nation-state 
emerged, contrary to the claims of some anti-essentialist scholars such as 
Benedict Anderson argues (1983). 
Analyzing Korean Political Economy 
In accounting for the dynamics of Korean economic transformation, several 
analytical perspectives have been suggested. The first is the market perspective, 
which attributes Korea’s economic success to an interplay of an open economy, 
market conforming government policies, and assertive entrepreneurship in the 
private sector. According to this view, Korean economic performance cannot be 
seen as a miracle, but is a natural and spontaneous outcome of the application 
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of classical economic principles. In addition to this structural framework for 
economic development, the Korean government adopted and implemented 
extensive market-confirming economic policies through macroeconomic 
stabilization and institutional reforms for export promotion. It was within this 
market-friendly institutional setting that private entrepreneurs were able to 
vigorously exploit their comparative advantage (Kil & Moon, 2001).  
The liberal market perspective had long prevailed as the dominant paradigm in 
accounting for South Korea’s economic transformation. From the early 1980's 
onward, however, neoclassical interpretations have been increasingly 
challenged. A group of political scientists, developmental economists, and 
sociologists, who belonged to the developmentalist state camp, have coalesced 
to refute the conventional wisdom and insights of the liberal paradigm 
(Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995; Haggard, 1990; Wade, 1990). These scholars stress 
the role of the state in economic transformation and development as a major 
player in triple alliances among the local state, local capital, and transnational 
capital. In opposition to the economically deterministic accounts of Third 
World development from both neoclassical interpretations and dependency 
theory, they emphasized the role of local policy-makers and their ideology in 
transforming national political economic arenas as well as international 
relations. According to these critics, market forces alone cannot adequately 
explain Korea’s economic transformation, and accounts emphasizing a 
minimalist state are simply incorrect. The state was neither a simple guarantor 
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of the existence of a free and competitive market nor a passive and neutral 
container of contending social political interests. The Korean state promoted its 
own developmental objectives framed around an ideology of potential national 
wealth and military strength, a framework which went well beyond the simple 
manipulation of macroeconomic parameters as argued by Kil and Moon (2001).  
The Korean state strategically intervened in the economy through planning 
rationales, industrial targeting, and the mobilization and selective allocation of 
resources in strategic sectors. In other words, the state virtually dictated the 
nature and direction of market forces in order to achieve its objectives by 
effectively utilizing the reservoir of policy instruments available to it. The state 
was able to govern market forces effectively because of its unique 
organizational features. While executive dominance ensured a centralized 
decision-making structure, the relative autonomy of the state and its powerful 
bureaucrats facilitated the formulation of efficient and consistent economic 
policies and their implementation. In fact, rapid capital accumulation and 
efficient economic policy require restrictions on social demands, not only of 
labor or the popular sector, but of rent-seeking business groups. The state was 
able to overcome this dilemma by insulating economic policy-making from 
these contending social pressures (Kil & Moon, 2001). Korea’s economic miracle, 
therefore, would never have occurred without the strategic intervention of an 
entrepreneurial and developmental state. 
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The claims of developmental statism are by and large predicated on a 
dichotomy of state and society, where the state is assumed to regularly 
dominate civil society. Some have criticized this binary distinction as an 
artificial analytical construct, arguing that state and society are always already 
interpenetrated through a myriad of formal and informal networks and that a 
country’s economic performance depends on the nature of these networks 
(Evans, 1995; Lee, 1992). In the Korean case, state-society networks have been 
based on a vertical hierarchy that enabled the state to dictate the form of social 
organization. But such a hierarchy has been complemented by horizontal ties 
formed through formal networks such as various councils and informal 
networks such as schools and families. Korea’s economic success can be 
ascribed to this rather unique state-society arrangement (Kil & Moon, 2001).  
The scene of international relations and the peculiarities of the southeast Asian 
regional system also factors in here, and accounts centered on these 
geopolitical facts have attracted increasing empirical support. Throughout the 
1950’s and 1960’s, Korea benefited from a special relationship with the United 
States. This relationship was predicated on the geopolitical assumptions of 
American policy-makers, who saw South Korea as an important arena for Cold 
War confrontation with the Soviet Union. American strategic interests in Korea 
allowed it to enjoy hefty economic benefits in terms of aid, trade, capital, and 
technology from the U.S. (Cumings, 1984). It is widely acknowledged that Korea 
could have not survived its economic hardships were it not for generous 
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American assistance in the 1950’s and Korean access to its export markets 
since the mid-1960’s. This unique geopolitical landscape, coupled with the 
expanding world economy at the time of Korea’s transition to an export-led 
growth strategy, facilitated its economic rise.  
Although these analytical perspectives seem convincing, the many forces 
propelling economic performance are multifaceted, and, therefore the market, 
the state, and the international system are not necessarily at odds when it 
comes to national development. Rather, the relationship, as is evident in the 
Korean context, can be understood as complementary. It is essential to 
integrate all perspectives in understanding Korea’s economic development. 
While the market and international system offer important (and perhaps even 
necessary) preconditions for economic success, the state and the political 
arrangements it defends also play their part. This is so not only because the 
state and politics influence economic policy, thereby affecting patterns of 
economic growth, but also because the state shapes the scene and scope of 
market and external transactions. These components of national power – 
market forces, the state, networks, and the international system – are not static 
but variable, and their shifting momentum generates profound impacts on 
economic performance (Moon, 1999; Kil & Moon, 2001). At the same time, these 
interacting elements in a variegated system of influence help explain not only 
economic success but also decline, as occurred with the IMF-induced crisis in 
1997. That upheaval in the capital markets ultimately required the International 
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Monetary Fund to bail out several Asian countries and their ailing economies 
(among them, South Korea), and is best accounted for looking into the dynamic 
interplay of these variables over time. Such events require reconsideration of 
the puzzle of the state-market relationship, especially if scholars are to achieve 
a more realistic understanding of the locally specific repercussions of 
globalized phenomena, and show how unique local factors and regional 
systems shape forces for economic betterment.  
Assessing the Plausibility of Political Economic Approaches  
Some argue that the international political economy can only be understood by 
bringing political and economic analysis into closer relationship with each 
other (Staniland, 1985; Meehan & Riordan, 2002). But the stipulation of clear 
distinctions between the developed (core) and the underdeveloped worlds 
(periphery), and deterministic models like world-systems theory (Wallerstein, 
1976) may not accurately portray the current scene of international relations.  
Mosco (1998) argues that what was once commonly called the Third World has 
now fragmented into many worlds, where one segment in particular has 
achieved significant overall growth rates that even surpass the West. Combining 
the newest technologies with the oldest means of authoritarian control, several 
Asian nations have put substantial economic distance between themselves and 
the rest of the underdeveloped world. These newly industrialized countries (or 
NICs) have often been cited as development models for the rest of the world. 
Even as analysts slowly come to recognize that the NIC strategy bears some 
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resemblance to the Western industrialization path (in both its success and 
horror), it is also important to acknowledge that the overall NIC economic 
performance puts those nations in a different class from much of the 
underdeveloped world.  
The diversity of claims made regarding NIC economic development requires an 
openness to the several different approaches available, and to the possibility 
that these accounts do not lead to accounts confirming globalized 
homogeneity. While one may subscribe to the core values and elements of a 
particular model, it has to be clearly recognized that certain internal variations 
are evident within these broad, conceptual, and more or less arbitrary 
frameworks. Needless to say, even very difficult to contest theories, such as 
those emphasizing interdependence, should not be judged adequate to convey 
the whole story of the so-called Asian Tigers.  
Single cases can require major modification of the claims made by grand 
theories. And changing theoretical perspectives cannot be isolated from 
historical changes, here, in evolution of the Korean state. Unfortunately, the 
hegemony of Anglo-American ideological premises today is one of the most 
salient forces shaping the specific character of globalization theory, including 
the perceived extent to which globalization is seen as diminishing nation-state 
power. Universalizing, overarching, and Euro-centric accounts must be 
reconsidered in light of regional variation.  
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The Rise of the Information Society in the Global/Local Context 
For more than twenty years, accounts of the Information Society have often 
been characterized by different versions of technological utopianism. New 
information and communication technologies have quickly grown into new 
spheres of economic activity. Most countries have rushed to build information-
based economies.  
Castells (2000) describes this shift as the emergence of a new society, an 
Information Age fundamentally different from past societies. This 
contemporary society has emerged because of many processes that coalesced 
in the last half of the 20th century, including the restructuring of capitalism 
and the introduction of new computing and telecommunications technologies. 
Each process has reacted to and accelerated globalization activity, and they also 
operate on each other. Their force is so pronounced that Castells postulates a 
fundamental change in social relations, in cultural milieus and in the form and 
experience of power in society. 
Under these circumstances and also influenced by a global emphasis on 
infrastructural development, Korea worked to build an economy based on 
information communication technology (ICT) while it also embraced the ICT 
transformation as a national policy priority. In the late 1980’s, Korea decided to 
build an integrated cable television infrastructure that would be unveiled in the 
middle of the 1990’s. In the early 1990’s, the Ministry of Information selected 
twenty companies which would provide cable television programming. The 
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Cable Television Act devised a plan to start twenty channels in eleven program 
categories to ensure diversity of content in cable services; news, movies, sports, 
arts, entertainment, education, music, children, women, religion, and 
transportation and tourism were all earmarked for support. Among the twenty 
channels started, the big three chaebols divided the potentially most profitable 
ones. Samsung bought the only pay cable channel (which would show films) 
and one arts and culture channel. Daewoo bought the movie channel and 
Hyundai bought the entertainment channel (Shim, 2002).  
The film industry provides an empirical lens through which the global effects 
of culture and media can be understood. In terms of the film industry, the 
Korean market had long been dominated by foreign, especially American, 
content. In a film market where only about five Korean movies a year could 
attract more than 100,000 viewers, several Hollywood films enjoyed Korean 
viewership of more than one million people in the early 1990’s. For example, 
the film and visual industry emerged as a promising and profitable industry 
that drew people’s attention to the so-called “Jurassic Park Syndrome.” The 
president and high-ranking government officials claimed that the profit yielded 
by the film Jurassic Park was equal to or even surpassed the dollar amount 
generated by exporting hundreds of thousands of Hyundai cars (Kang, 2004).  
This was the culmination of a trend that began in 1988, when the direct 
distribution of Hollywood films started and Hollywood’s dominance intensified. 
In 1987, Hollywood films enjoyed a theater attendance market share of 53%. By 
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1994, this figure had risen to 80%. The popularity of foreign films resulted in 
the near extinction of local film production. The number of produced Korean 
films dropped from 121 in 1991 to 63 in 1994. And after the introduction of 
Hollywood direct distribution, more than ten Korean film importers went out of 
business. Meanwhile, the major Hollywood distributors have reported Korean 
market revenue increases in the 60% range every year since 1988 (Yi, 1994; 
Shim 2002). Consequently, the government and companies began to realize that 
a well-made visual product could match a year or even two years’ corporate 
export profit, and as this realization grew the perceived need to develop the 
domestic media industry grew.  
Among its responses, the Korean government quickly moved to recognize the 
importance of copyright industries (such as the motion picture business), since 
the Uruguay Round (UR) accord required all 116 GATT member nations to open 
their markets to financial services, communications, construction, wholesaling, 
transportation and tourism competition. The sense of crisis this evoked for the 
Korean media content industry was real, and the issue was seen as having both 
cultural and economic implications, a point emphasized by Shim (2002). Along 
with cable and new regional commercial broadcasting in Korea, the increased 
number of TV channels led many to believe that foreign programs would 
dominate Korean living rooms. The growing concern that national media 
industries would be eclipsed as foreign media and software competitors 
expanded led the government to announce investments and other policy 
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measures to promote the visual and content industry. The Department of 
Culture and Tourism organized committees and task force teams that studied 
and issued reports promoting the development of the visual industry. Many of 
the major report recommendations were adopted (Kang, 2004), and the 
government has since invested tens of millions of dollars in the film, content, 
and software industries.  
The Emerging Culture Industry 
Since the late 1980’s, a period when Hollywood films dominated the national 
media industry, the Korean government has realized the importance of the high 
value-added media industry as a nationally strategic industry for the new 
millennium. Hence, the Korean government encouraged the revival of the 
Korean film industry starting in 1995, when the first of a series of policies and 
incentive plans were devised.  
The government enacted the Motion Picture Promotion Law, which offered a 
range of incentives to attract corporate and investment capital into the ailing 
film industry. The main part of this law provides tax breaks for film studios to 
bring increased chaebol capital into the film industry. The government has 
directly supported film and other production industries since 1999 and also 
opened a School of Film and Multimedia in 1995 at the Korean National 
University of Arts, with the intent of producing trained filmmakers able to use 
next-generation media technologies (Kookmin Ilbo, 1995; Shim, 2002).  
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It is also widely acknowledged that a screen quota system was instrumental in 
the recent revitalization of Korean film. As a protective measure for the Korean 
film industry, the screen quota system played a key role in supporting domestic 
film by forcing local theaters to screen a certain number of domestic movies in 
their theaters; for at least 146 days a year domestic films had to be shown (Jin, 
2003). Some critics argue that the Korean film industry does not yet have a 
viable alternative to the screen quota system able to help the local film industry 
secure sustainable growth. Hollywood movies, which still control roughly 85 
percent of the global film market, are now scrambling to maintain ticket 
revenues in South Korea, which until recently was seen as a relatively small East 
Asian market (The Korea Herald, October 2004). To recover diminishing market 
share, Hollywood continues to pressure American trade negotiators to abolish 
the screen quota system. So far these efforts have failed, and the Korean 
government has refused to eliminate the quota under domestic pressures, 
including a series of high profile rallies organized by directors, actors, students, 
and other nongovernmental civil society organizations (Jin, 2003).  
Under these favorable conditions, several chaebols expanded their investments 
into cultural production after they took ownership of cable channels, and 
others initiated media-related projects in order not to fall behind their 
competitors. In order to compete with Hollywood direct distribution, the 
Korean film industry also needed the active participation of chaebol. Hence, 
from the perspective of Korean motion picture revitalization, the film industry 
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welcomed the chaebol’s capital and marketing. Chaebols have invested in 
almost every sector of media industries and information communication 
technology. Their conventional strategy – "Do whatever is profitable" – has now 
been utilized in the full range of media industry development strategies (Shim, 
2002). Samsung’s participation in media industries is a good illustration of 
these efforts. Prior to the 1990’s, Samsung was already running a broadcasting 
network and the JoongAng Daily from the 1960's, but its active involvement in 
a broader range of media acquisitions has steadily grown.  
Venture capital has also contributed to the Korean media industry. For 
example, film production companies, which in 1998 only numbered 116, had 
grown in number to as many as 918 by 2001 and the number of distribution 
companies jumped from 155 to 268 between 1999 and 2001, mainly due to 
venture capital incentives (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2002). Cinema 
Service, the nation’s largest film distributor, introduced a new source of film 
financing, with the launch of a public film investment fund by Hana Bank in 
2001; this marked the first ever involvement of the banking sector in financially 
supporting the national film industry (Jin, 2003). 
A Korean Media Industrial Renaissance 
At the moment, Korea’s culture industry is enjoying something of a heyday. 
Korea has become the seventh-largest film market in the world, with national 
film attendance totals by 2000 exceeding 70 million. In a phenomenon the 
Asian mass media have referred to as the Korean Wave, Korea is now a brisk 
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exporter of music, TV programming, and films to the Asia-Pacific region (The 
Korea Herald, May 2002). The film industry currently generates an estimated 
$620 million per year, which seems relatively meager compared to Hollywood, 
where a single project may cost more than $100 million. Still, with current 
blockbusters like “Silmido” and “Taegugki” breaking attendance records, 
analysts claim the local movie industry can regularly produce movies with 
tremendous commercial value. As Ko Jeong-min, chief research at the Samsung 
Economic Research Institute, put it: “Movies are not yet a driving economic 
force, but it has the potential to become just that in coming years” (The Korea 
Herald, March 2004).  
Recent critical acclaim, including the Best Director award for director Im Kwon-
Taek’s (for Chihwaseon at the 2002 Cannes Film Festival) and director Park 
Chan-Wook’s winning the Jury Grand Prize for Old Boy at the 2004 Cannes Film 
Festival, seem to portend the long-anticipated renaissance of Korean cinema 
(Ryoo, 2004). In 2004, Old Boy sold its remake rights to Universal Pictures at 
the American Film Market in Los Angeles.  
What contribution did corporate investments make to the broader Korean 
culture industries? When financially strapped companies had to streamline 
their sprawling operations in the midst of Korean economic crisis and IMF-
directed restructuring, stakes in the film industry were sometimes cashed out, 
since they were not seen as part of core operations and were losing money. But 
the result of this process of liquidation and consolidation was the introduction 
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by the larger conglomerates of new business-savvy techniques into what had 
been mom-and-pop management in the Korean film industry, including 
marketing and audience research as a central aspect of film production. With 
corporate investment, film companies recruited fresh talent, including creative 
young directors equipped with diplomas from the world's most prestigious film 
schools (Shim, 2002). Flush with cash investments made by a handful of 
companies, the Korean film industry produced a series of blockbusters, 
including Shiri (1999), Joint Security Area (2000), Friends (2001), and others.  
Corporations thus played a considerable role in the restructuring of the 
struggling local film industry and the resulting rebirth of Korean cinema. By 
February 2004, Korean-made movies enjoyed a market share of 82.5 percent, an 
all-time level that broke the record set only a month earlier. Director Kang Je-
Gyu of KangJeGyu Films, the mastermind behind Korea's first blockbuster 
“Shiri” in 1999, broke the ten million attendance record set by “Silmido” with 
his Korean War epic “Taegugki (The Brotherhood of War)” in 2004, seen by at 
least thirteen million customers. At the American Film Market, “Taegugki” 
earned an additional $500,000 from overseas distribution deals. With public 
eager to share in the glory, filmmakers hope to attract as many investors as 
they can to finance better movies that generate bigger revenues (The Korea 
Herald, March 2004). The hope is that this emerging track record will attract 
growing Korean audiences, who by all accounts continue to seek local 
alternatives to Hollywood fare, that they will flock to the newly built 
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megaplexes to watch these well-made movies, investors happy, the money 
rolling in.  
What are the consequences of this remarkable cultural phenomenon? No 
significant increase of foreign programming on over-the-air television has 
occurred. Both commercial and public television channels devote about fifteen 
percent of their time to foreign programs, a ratio roughly on par with foreign 
programming prior to the upsurge of globalization discourse. Of course, this is 
partly due to the screen quota system imposed by the Korean government, a 
system WTO still aims to abolish. But it is also true because foreign programs, 
apart from blockbuster films already being seen in theatres and some 
entertainment programs enjoying worldwide popularity (e.g., “The X-Files,” 
“ER,” “Friends,” etc.), are not so attractive to Korean audiences who prefer 
domestic programs such as historical and trendy drama (Korean Broadcasting 
Institute 2001; 1997).  
The most lucrative programming timeslots, ranging from early evening to late 
night, are taken by domestic and very traditional programs (i.e., drama) that are 
sometimes derivative of American and Japanese genres (e.g., music shows, talk 
shows, reality TV, sitcoms) but also locally adapted. It should be also noted that 
Korean television shows and movies have gained wider popularity in other 
Asian countries including Japan, China, Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan, and Hong 
Kong (Kim, 2003). This so-called Korean Wave reflects the intensified 
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deregulation that resulted from the transplantation of the discourse of national 
competitiveness into the media industry. 
The Future of the Role of the State in Korea 
Starting in the late 1980s, Korea adopted media liberalization as a way of 
managing the pressures of globalization in the context of economic 
deregulation and the convergence of new information technology and 
traditional media. To attract foreign capital, the state planned overall market 
deregulation. But the state has not left media industries entirely at the mercy of 
market logic. While such a media liberalization is sometimes viewed as an 
alternative path for the achievement of democratization, the Korean state also 
actively involved and encouraged domestic content production as a means of 
restricting foreign content. 
It is ironic that the increasing interdependence of global culture leads some 
nation states to oppose the pressures of globalization when it comes to the 
preservation of local communicative capacities. While neoliberalism and 
financial liberalization compel national governments in the Third World to 
mediate the logic of privatization and deregulation, the critique of cultural 
imperialism simultaneously induces other nations to inhibit the freedom of 
capital and TNCs (Schiller, 1979).  
Given these contradictory trends, it is premature to assume that the state is 
inevitably weakened in a global age characterized by increasing international 
trade flows. Rather, under certain conditions, a greater reliance on trade can be 
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associated with an increased role for the state rather than a diminished one, 
where the state will retain a considerable level of policy autonomy sufficient to 
construct distinctive economic and social systems. Strong states may provide a 
competitive advantage in a globalizing economy and culture, and this is 
nowhere more evidence than in Asian. For example, East Asian states such as 
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan have used various strategies where 
the state played a central role to protect Asia’s position regarding the 
international division of labor. Although the role of the state varies across these 
cases, no one would argue that they are stateless societies.  
State policies, including aggressive business strategy, can be central and active 
to this process of localization. Globalization, when understood as a complex of 
trade flows, but also the full range of possible state responses to those flows, 
thus cannot be predictably understood as a cure for the ills of nationalism, 
despite the optimism of some of its advocates (Ignatieff, 1994). National 
identity and localized sovereignty are unlikely to be soon abandoned even as 
globalization enjoys its heyday (Choi, 1996). The role of the state in the process 
of sustaining national culture industry is crucial and likely to receive continued 
support.  
Because nations have not responded to globalization in a singular way, due to 
the specificities of national history, politics, culture and economy, the impact of 
globalization will not be uniform or unidirectional. The global tides of market 
competition and transnational corporate governance should not be understood 
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as an undifferentiated universal trend. Instead, these forces may take different 
configurations, which remain nation-specific as well as global. Given sufficient 
local political will, states retain a considerable ability to resist the pressures of 
global capital and transnational organizations.  
The South Korean case forces us to reexamine the idea that effective 
participation in a globalized economy and culture is best achieved by 
restricting state involvement. It suggests that successful participation in the 
global arena may actually be best achieved through more intense state 
involvement.  
South Korea is not a perfect model, for the very uniqueness that made Korea 
accomplish so much means that its path cannot be explicitly followed. But if 
there is a general lesson, it is that a society can rise from its own ashes and 
merge the important strands of its traditions with the diverse impulses 
emanating from global sources into a particular and efficacious tapestry of 
both internal excellence and international pride. This is probably one clear 
lesson from the Korean case that argues against the neoliberal and other Euro-
centric globalization discourses. 
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